The 
"Collider" splitting the classical Bayes' scheme by the theory of co∼events
The axiomatics of the theory of experience and chance [1] is fundamentally new with the new semantics 1 of terms and statements. This axiomatics is not too complicated. However, any attempts to apply the new theory in various fields, which are a long-lived fiefdom of probability theory and mathematical statistics, face difficulties in translating from a probabilistic language into the dual language of the new theory. This translation reminds me of an investigation of the splitting of previously unsplittable notions of probability and event by means of a co∼event-based "collider" that is provided with sufficient power of the new theory to split what was previously unsplittable and to get instead of one probability two measures: probability and believability, and instead of one event two: a ket-event and a bra-event. Here I intend to split the logic of uncertainty by the example of splitting the logic and the interpretation of Bayes' scheme by this co∼event-based "collider", i.e., by the co∼event-based axiomatics of the new theory. In order to present in all details this process of co∼event-based splitting of the previously unsplittable logic of uncertainty in Bayes' scheme, I will first present a simpler, crude and naive procedure for the co∼event-based splitting, and then I will go into its refinement. I will carry out this co∼event-based splitting of the Bayesian scheme in two stages. In the first stage 2 , I am going to first compare three formally possible splitting methods to choose the most suitable of them. In the second stage (see paragraph 2.1), I'm going to continue the co∼event-based splitting. However, now I will split the chosen splitting method itself in order to construct the final formula, which I would call the co∼event-based Bayes' theorem. 
Empirical science is oriented towards collecting new experimental or historical observations that can inform us about
the chances of these random observations (1.1). Suppose we denote the numerical data that summarises the result of an experienced random experiment, i.e. some co∼event, by a letter R. Co∼event-based Bayes' scheme provides a logical mathematical framework for calibrating how the co∼event R should be used to inform us about a new understanding of the relative certainties given this new data. Technically, it yields numerical values for the conditional certainties Φ(⟨Ω| 1⟩ |R); Φ(⟨Ω| 2 ⟩ |R); . . . ; Φ(⟨Ω| ⟩ |R); (1.7)
that are based on their initial information sources augmented by the new co∼event, R. The numerical differences between the certainties (1.4) and the conditional certainties (1.7) display what one can rightfully learn about our assessment of this co∼event. This assessment, in the long and the short of statistical theory, is the goal of scientific experimentation and data analysis. Because these distributions can represent uncertain observable features of Nature before and after co∼event, R, the former is commonly called a "prior" certainties (1.4) , while the latter is called the "posterior" certainties (1.7) for the random observations (1.1).
the experience of these accumulated hypotheses (4.1). Suppose we denote the numerical data that summarises the result of an experienced random experiment, i.e. some co∼event, by a letter R. Co∼event-based Bayes' scheme provides a logical mathematical framework for calibrating how the co∼event R should be used to inform us about a new understanding of the relative certainties given this new data. Technically, it yields numerical values for the conditional certainties Φ(⟨ 1|Ω⟩ |R); Φ(⟨ 2|Ω⟩ |R); . . . ; Φ(⟨ |Ω⟩ |R); (1.8) that are based on their initial information sources augmented by the new co∼event, R. The numerical differences between the certainties (1.6) and the conditional certainties (1.8) display what one can rightfully learn about our assessment of the accumulated hypotheses from this co∼event. This assessment, in the long and the short of statistical theory, is the goal of scientific experimentation and data analysis. Because these distributions can represent uncertain opinions before and after co∼event, R, the former is commonly called a "prior" certainties (1.6), while the latter is called the "posterior" certainties (1.8) for the accumulated hypotheses (4.1).
The Bayes' scheme in the context of the theory of experience and chance requires that we assess the certainty of the co∼event R that occurs, given each of the relevant random observations. These assessments are represented by the numbers
where Φ(R| ⟨Ω| ⟩) = B(⟨ |), = 1, . . . , . The relative sizes of these numbers for the various random observations based on the same data are commonly referred to as the certainties for the random observations. Using these certainties for the observed data on the basis of each of the random observations, co∼event-based Bayes' scheme allows the computation of each of the "posterior" certainties (1.7) according to the computational formula
for each random observation | ⟩ and "prior" certainties (1.4) where Φ(⟨Ω| ⟩ |R) = B(⟨ |).
accumulated hypotheses. These assessments are represented by the numbers
where Φ(R| ⟨ |Ω⟩) = P(| ⟩), = 1, . . . , . The relative sizes of these numbers for the various accumulated hypotheses based on the same data are commonly referred to as the certainties for the accumulated hypotheses. Using these certainties for the observed data on the basis of each of the accumulated hypotheses, co∼event-based Bayes' scheme allows the computation of each of the "posterior" certainties (1.8) according to the computational formula called the co∼event-based Bayes theorem:
for each accumulated hypothesis ⟨ | and "prior" certainties (1.6) where Φ(⟨ |Ω⟩ |R) = P(| ⟩). prior:
posterior:
Co∼event-based Bayes' ket-formula that follows from (1.10) Co∼event-based Bayes' theorem that follows from (1.12)
(1.20) Table 2 : A logic of the dual co∼event-based analogies of Bayes' scheme in the theory of experience and chance in abbreviations.
Certainty bra-ket theory
In pondering a chance of Nature, and an accumulated own experience, a scientist after all of the experienced-random experiment observes the chance and accumulates his/her observer' experience as a limited array of "accumulated hypotheses" × "random observations".
Suppose we list them and denote them by the symbols
Since the list is meant to be exhaustive of the elementary co∼events that the scientist observed and accumulated, a total certainty of all elementary co∼events of the experienced-random experiment would be distributed among these × elementary co∼events ⟨ | ⟩. Norming the total certainty to a unit of 1, relative certainties of these elementary co∼events are expressed by the certainties
Empirical science is oriented towards collecting new experimental or historical co∼events that can inform us about these co∼events. Suppose we denote the numerical data that summarises the result of an experienced-random experiment, i.e. some co∼event, by a letter R. Co∼event-based Bayes' scheme provides a logical mathematical framework for calibrating how the co∼event R should be used to inform us about a new understanding of the relative certainties given this new data. Technically, it yields numerical values for the conditional certainties Φ(⟨ | ⟩ |R) that are based on their initial information sources augmented by the new co∼event, R. The numerical differences between the initial certainties and the conditional certainties display what one can rightfully learn about our assessment of this co∼event. This assessment, in the long and the short of statistical theory, is the goal of scientific experienced-random experimentation and data analysis. Because these distributions can represent the uncertainty of Nature before and after co∼event, R, the former is commonly called a "prior" certainties, while the latter is called the "posterior" certainties of the elementary co∼events.
The Bayes' scheme in the context of the theory of experience and chance requires that we assess the certainty of the co∼event R that occurs, given each of the relevant elementary co∼events. These assessments are represented by the numbers Φ(R| ⟨ | ⟩). The relative sizes of these numbers for the various elementary co∼events based on the same data are commonly referred to as the certainties for the elementary co∼events. Using these certainties for the observed data on the basis of each of the co∼events, co∼event-based Bayes' scheme allows the computation of each of the "posterior" certainties according to the computational formula
for each elementary co∼event ⟨ | ⟩ and their "prior" certainties ( ) where prior certainty: 22) posterior certainty:
Hence united co∼event-based Bayes' bra-ket formula (1.21) can be rewritten in the short form:
(1.25) Taking up this matter, primarily, I believed that as a result of this dual splitting I will get two dual theorems that are analogous to Bayes' scheme. The first is about "posterior believability" of an accumulated hypothesis, and the second is about "posterior probability" of a random observation. Moreover, I assumed I would get one general theorem on the "posterior certainty" of the co∼event. However, this time my "formal" intuition turned out to be powerless. A brutal reality has revealed many more interesting things than all my ordinary assumptions.
The Tables 1 and 2 compare the logic of the dual analogies of the classical Bayes' scheme formally in the contexts of probability theory and believability theory. It remains for me to note that within the framework of the theory of certainties ostensibly another analogy it unites both dual analogies may seem possible (see Table 3 ).
The logic of uncertainty it follows from the theory of experience and chance allows us to draw a completely definite conclusion about the three analogies of Bayes' scheme ( Firstly, the ket-formula (1.10) "puts the cart before the horse", "puts the chance before the experience", "puts the sequence before the cause", and "puts the past before the future". It considers that the a posteriori probability of the chance observation as an outcome of a random experiment depends on the a priori believability of the observer' experience. This is nonsense.
Secondly, the bra-ket formula (1.21) inherits all the sins of Bayes' formula interpreted within the framework of probability theory, comparing the probabilities of co∼events from different spaces -of the original and conditional spaces.
And thirdly, only the bra-formula (1.20) is free from these contradictions, calculating the a posteriori believability in the experience of the observer through his/her a priori believability and through the a priori probabilities of his/her chance observations.
At the same time, the third formula (1.20, 1.12) reflects only the most general co∼event-based logic of uncertainty in the Bayes' scheme. Although the third formula is true in principle it is too rude and naive from the co∼event-based point of view. We now turn to the co∼event-based refinement of these formulas.
Co∼event-based refinement of the Bayes' scheme
To refine the formulas (1.20, 1.12) in the co∼event-based Bayesian scheme, we need to sacrifice the brevity of the notation. This is a needful measure. Since three co∼event actors, not one, are involved in this scheme, and they act in the same bra-ket space ⟨Ω|Ω⟩.
In pondering a chance of Nature, and an accumulated own experience, a scientist after all of the experienced-random experiment observes the chance and accumulates his/her observer' experience as two co∼events: R = "Reality (chance, or random observations)" ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩ , (2.1)
From these co∼events we will construct one more useful co∼event
Having at our disposal these three co∼event actors, R, H, and M, we can fully describe what is occurring in the co∼event-based Bayesian scheme.
What does the expression "the co∼event M is at our disposal" in the theory of experience and chance mean?
This means that we know the probability, believability, and certainty distributions of the co∼event M:
defined on the bra-ket space ⟨Ω|Ω⟩, which has the labelling ⟨X M | S X M ⟩ generated by M. Similar information is known to us about events H and R. We know the probability, believability, and certainty distributions of the co∼event H:
defined on the bra-ket space ⟨Ω|Ω⟩, which has the labelling ⟨X H | S X H ⟩ generated by H. And we know the probability, believability, and certainty distributions of the co∼event R:
defined on the bra-ket space ⟨Ω|Ω⟩, which has the labelling ⟨X R | S X R ⟩ generated by R.
Now we see that to refine the mathematical description of the co∼event-based Bayesian scheme, we must describe three co∼events, which are defined on the same bra-ket space ⟨Ω|Ω⟩. Here the most important difficulty is they generate three different labellings
The labelling ⟨X H | S X H ⟩ is generated by the co∼event H that describes results of the preliminary experienced-random experiment in which "an observer for each observation puts forward one or another subset of hypotheses about the observation". For example, "the observer preliminary checkups of the set of patients and for each patient puts forward the one or another subset of hypotheses about her/his diagnosis".
The labelling ⟨X R | S X R ⟩ is generated by the co∼event R that describes results of the experienced-random experiment in which "an observer for each observation takes a real decision based on complete information about the observation". For example, "the observer for each patient determines a real diagnosis based on a complete medical examination of the patient".
The labelling ⟨X M | S X M ⟩ is generated by the co∼event M = (H∆ M) that is a co∼event-valued function of H and R. In other words, the co∼event M is defined by two experienced-random experiments as a result of which two co∼events occur: H ("Hypotheses") and R ("Reality"). The labelling ⟨X M | S X M ⟩ is defined as a Minkowski intersection of two previous labellings
where
14)
In our case of co∼event-based Bayesian scheme we have equality for all
from which it follows that 
occurs. Then the observer conducts exhaustive observations and examinations {| ∘ 1 ⟩ , . . . , | ∘ ⟩} of the objects, as a result of which the co∼event
occurs and defines the corresponding subsets of the set of real conclusions
After comparing the events H and R the co∼event M = (H∆ R) = "Match Hypotheses with Reality" = ⟨ 1 |(
occurs, which I am going to use as the basis in a formulation of the co∼event-based Bayes' theorem 4 .
Theorem 1 (co∼event-based Bayes theorem). Let H = "Hypotheses", R = "Reality", and M = (H∆ R) = "Match Hypotheses with Reality" be co∼events defined on the bra-ket space ⟨Ω|Ω⟩ from the certainty space (⟨Ω|Ω⟩ , ⟨A|A⟩ , Φ) = ⟨Ω, A, B|Ω, A, P⟩ with believability B, probability P, and certainty
labellings generated by the co∼events H, R, and M ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩ respectively where
be respectively a priori and a posteriori believability of the hypothesis ⟨ | , ∈ X M , and
) be a probability of match the ket-event | × ⟩ with the ket-event | ∘ ⟩ ⊆ |Ω⟩. At last, let a posteriori believability of bra-event ⟨ × | ⊆ ⟨Ω| under the condition that M has occurred is equal to the fraction of certainty of the sub-co∼event
Then a posteriori and a priori believability distributions
Proof. We use as the template the third co∼event formula (1.20, 1.12) of the Bayesian scheme chosen by us from Tables 1, 2 , and 3 in order to rewrite it for the event M in the following way:
Now it remains for us to notice the following equalities:
in order for the theorem to be proved. Indeed, we have the equality (3.11) because
the equality (3.12) because
due to the fact that for ket-events |(
. At last, the equality (3.13) follows from our main co∼event-based Bayes assumption (3.8) because
Finally, from (3.11), (3.12), and (3.13) it follows that
The theorem is proved.
Corollary 1 (on a posteriori certainty of co∼event M). The posterior believability distribution { post : ∈ X M } calculated by the co∼event-based Bayes' theorem (1) defines the posterior certainty of the co∼event M = "Match Hypotheses with Reality" by the following formula:
Proof. The corollary is valid because post ( ) = post ( / /X M ) for ∈ X M and ∈ S X M and because the certainty measure Φ is additive.
An example: "Doctor and Patients with a headache"
Suppose you are a doctor, and a patient comes to you, complaining of a headache. Further, suppose that there are two yours hypotheses for why people get headaches, they can have a headache due to a brain tumor: ⟨ | ⊆ ⟨Ω|, or they can have a headache due to a cold: ⟨ | ⊆ ⟨Ω|, ⟨ | + ⟨ | = ⟨Ω|. The diagnosis of people can be of four varieties, they might have a brain tumor: |{ }⟩ ⊆ |Ω⟩, they might have a cold: |{ }⟩ ⊆ |Ω⟩, they might have a brain tumor and a cold: |{ , }⟩ ⊆ |Ω⟩, and, finally, they may have neither a brain tumor nor a cold: |∅⟩ ⊆ |Ω⟩ where |{ }⟩ + |{ }⟩ + |{ , }⟩ + |∅⟩ = |Ω⟩. A brain tumor always causes a headache, but exceedingly few people have a brain tumor. In contrast, a headache is rarely a symptom of cold, but most people manage to catch a cold every single year.
Let us assume that after your preliminary checkup of the 200 patients your hypotheses formed the statistics of the co∼event H ="headaches"= ⟨ |{
The statistics of hypothetic diagnoses allows you to evaluate the probabilities of hypothetic diagnoses of the 200 patients as follows:
Then after a complete medical examination of the same 200 patients, the real statistics of the co∼event
The real statistics allows you to evaluate the probabilities of real diagnoses of the 200 patients as follows:
Provided that the co∼event M = (H∆ R) = "match hypotheses with real diagnoses" occurred and in the absence of other information on believabilities of yours hypotheses, i.e. B(⟨ |) = = 1/2, B(⟨ |) = = 1/2, do you think it is more believably that a headache is caused by a tumor: ⟨ |, or by a cold: ⟨ |? In other words, do you think how the believability distribution of your hypotheses could be after a complete medical examination of the 200 patients? The answer to this question you can get with the help of the co∼event-based Bayes' theorem (3.9).
In the terminology of the example "Doctor and Patients" the labelling ⟨X H | S X H ⟩ is generated by the co∼event H that describes results of the experienced-random experiment "preliminary checkup of the 200 patients and assigning their diagnosis to the first or the second hypothesis". The labelling ⟨X R | S X R ⟩ is generated by the co∼event R that describes results of the experienced-random experiment "assigning diagnosis to the first or the second type after a complete medical examination of the same 200 patients". The labelling ⟨X M | S X M ⟩ is generated by the co∼event M = (H∆ R) that is a co∼event-valued function of H and R. In other words, the co∼event R is defined by two experienced-random experiments "checkup of the 200 patients and assigning their diagnosis to the first or the second hypothesis" (H) and "assigning diagnosis to the first or the second type after a complete medical examination of the same 200 patients" (R). And the labelling ⟨X M | S X M ⟩ is defined as a Minkowski intersection of two previous labellings
In our case of co∼event-based Bayesian scheme we have equality ⟨ | = ⟨ × | = ⟨ ∘ | for all ∈ X R from which it follows that
We'll continue with a few brief examples, illustrating the co∼event-based Bayes' theorem (see Theorem 1). Let's consider examples in which the hypothesis statistics of the co∼event H will be the same (see Table 4 ), and the real statistics of the co∼event R will be presented in three variants (see Table 5 , at the top). Correspondingly, the statistics of the co∼event M = (H∆ R) will be presented also in the three variants (see Table 5 at the bottom).
In the first example (Tables 4, 5 ) with a posteriori certainty one 5 the posteriori believability distribution of your hypotheses is uniform: In the second example (Tables 4, 7 ) by virtue of the fact that Φ(M) = 0, the co∼event-based Bayes' theorem is not applicable and the posterior believability distribution and the posterior certainty of M remain to be undefined. b.tumor: Example 1: Table 6 : Venn diagrams of the three co∼events H, R, and M = (HΔ R) Example 2: Table 11 : Venn diagrams of the three co∼events H, R, and M = (HΔ R)
)︁ in the co∼event-based Bayesian scheme.
In the third example (Tables 4, 9 ) the prior certainty is 0.6 and with a posteriori certainty 0.867 the posteriori believability distribution of your hypotheses has the form:
In the fourth example (Tables 4, 10 ) the prior certainty is 0.6 and with a posteriori certainty 0.867 the posteriori believability distribution of your hypotheses has the form: 5 Once more example: "10 tasters trying wine from 10 bottles"
Imagine 10 tasters { 1 , . . . , 10 } trying wine from 10 bottles whose winemakers are known. First, each taster, after recognizing the wine maker of the wine, puts forward hypothesis whether this wine is good or not. As a result of such an experience-random experiment the co∼event
occurs. Here | × ⟩ ⊆ |Ω⟩ is the -th subset of 10 bottles such that the -th taster assumes the wine from this subset of bottles would be good. Second, each taster tasting wine from each bottle. As a result of such an experience-random experiment the co∼event
occurs. Here | ∘ ⟩ ⊆ |Ω⟩ is the -th subset of 10 bottles such that the -th taster considers the wine from this subset of bottles is good. After comparing the co∼events H and R the co∼event M = (H∆ R) = "Match Hypotheses with Reality" = ⟨ 1 |(
occurs.
Example 5: Table 12 : Venn diagrams of the three co∼events H, R, and M = (HΔ R)
)︁ in the co∼event-based Bayesian scheme. Table 12 shows the results of the tasting. The believability and probability characteristics of the co∼event M have the following forms 
The fact that the wine from 10 bottles has good quality in the opinion of 10 tasters has the prior certainty 
A recurrent sequence of co∼event-based Bayes' formulas
After computing the a posteriori characteristics of the co∼event M (see, for example, (5.5) and (5.6)), it becomes possible to use the co∼event-based Bayes' theorem once again, applying it not to the a priori, but to the a posteriori characteristics obtained in the first step. This recurrent procedure can be applied repeatedly to trace changes in the posterior characteristics of the event M.
Theorem 2 (the limit believability distribution in a recurrent co∼event-based Bayes' formula). Let the subset max = { : ∈ X M , = max ∈X M } ⊆ X M consists of all such ∈ X M for which the probabilities take a maximum value. Then the limit believability distribution in a recurrent co∼event-based Bayes' formula
1)
3)
are the characteristics of the event M, computed in the first step, has the following form:
Proof follows from the Banach fixed-point theorem [3] . ( / /X M ) 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 Corollary 2 (the limit certainty in a recurrent co∼event-based Bayes' formula).
Proof is obvious. Figures 1, and 2 and Tables 13, 14 , and 15 illustrate Theorem and Corollary.
The recurrent application of the co∼event-based Bayes' theorem can be interpreted as a repetition of the experienced-random experiment as a result of which the same co∼events H and R occur every time. Theorem 2 asserts that if the experienced-random experiment is repeated many times, the sequence of believability distributions tends to the limit believability distribution. And the value of this limit distribution can be considered as the same characteristic of the believabilities of co∼events H and R, which 1/2 is for the probabilistic distribution of a fair coin. Theorem 2 can serve as the basis for the formulation and proof of the co∼event law of large numbers.
Notes in conclusion
We exist in the world of uncertainties. Any uncertainty always arises from a conflict of experience and chance, more precisely, from a conflict between the observer's experience and the chance observation. In other words, this indivisible pair, "experience and chance", is the source of any uncertainty. Other sources of uncertainty simply do not exist. A theory that describes this conflict strictly mathematically is the new theory, called the theory of co∼events, or the theory of experience and chance [1] . Now we can say that this theory is a theory of uncertainty in its broadest sense 7 .
The eventology approach [6] gave impetus to the development of a theory that turned out to be broader than the theory of probabilities. This new theory is a dual combination of two theories -Kolmogorov's theory of probabilities of ket-events (k-e.'s) and its dual reflection -a new theory of believabilities of braevents (b-e.'s). Today, the theory of co∼events has a strict axiomatics [1, 4, 2] , in which Kolmogorov k-e.'s describing the future chance of observation are dually reflected in b-e.'s describing the past experience of the observer. The co∼events are defined as the measurable binary relations on the Cartesian product: "a set of b-e.'s × a set of terraced k-e.'s" and describe the present uncertainty that is generated by a pair of "experience and chance". This new theory is not one of the branches of probability theory. It offers a new axiomatic foundation for all those theories that are fundamentally based on mathematical probability. For example, for the Bayesian (subjective), propensity, or frequentist probability. Until now, all these approaches relied on the same mathematical probability Kolmogorov axiomatized. The new theory offers a new system of axioms, which contains Kolmogorov's axiomatics as one of the dual halves. Therefore the new theory of experience and chance as a rigorous axiomatic mathematical basis allows one to unite all existing acceptable interpretations of uncertainty into one general co∼event-based approach.
Axiomatics of the theory of co∼events
A past experience and a future chance are described by a unified theory. In the theory of co∼events [1] the logic of experience is directed to the past and the logic of chance is directed to the future. So the logic of experience reverses the logic of the chance with respect to the time direction. This is a simple consequence of the co∼event-based axiomatics where the experience is described by the b-e's, and the chance is described by the k-e's. And if some bra-event is experienced, then all the b-e's that are contained in it are experienced, i.e. which might be its possible causes in the past. And when some ket-event happens, then all the k-e's happen that contain it, i.e. which may be its consequences in the future. So the logic of experience is always the logic of the past experience, and the logic of chance is always the logic of the future chance. This theory introduces a new believability measure for measuring past experience and uses the Kolmogorov probability measure to measure a future chance.
Only a measuring the believability of all the probabilistic distribution of the ket-event makes sense in the theory of co∼events. I think everyone agrees that when tossing a fair coin, one typically can measure her/his believability only in that the outcomes "head" and "tail" are equally likely to happen. This obvious statement agrees with the co∼event-based axiomatics of the theory of experience and chance. If you toss a fair coin many times, then the new theory allows you to measure your believability only in all the probabilistic distribution of this coin. In the framework of this theory, you can measure your believability only in that the probability of a head happens and the probability of a tail happens are somewhere near 1/2. In this theory, a measuring the believability in the fall of the head, or believability in the fall of the tail does not make sense. Only a measuring the believability of all the probabilistic distribution of the coin makes sense here.
A measuring the believability of a set of b-e's is a measuring its believability distribution. Also I think everyone agrees that when tossing a given set of unfair coins, one typically can measure her/his believabilities only in a set of unfair coin probability distributions, i.e., one can measure only a set of believabilities which form the believability distribution of the set of unfair coins. In other words, one can measure only a set of believabilities the sum of which is equal to one. Thus, if you are interested in several believabilities in results of some experience-random experiment, then you can get the answer only in the form of some believability distribution.
The measuring a co∼event in the theory of experience and chance means the measuring three its measures simultaneously: probability, believability and certainty. In this theory the probability measure is defined on a set of observations (k-e's), and the believability measure is defined on a set of observers (b-e's). The probability measures the chances of observations, and the believability measures the experiences of observers. It is said that with certainty Φ(M) the co∼event M has the probability distribution of k-e's (observations) p X M and the believability distribution of b-e's (observers)˘X M . Thus, the certainty of a co∼event is a measure of the combination of its probabilistic and believabilistic measures, which is defined by this co∼event. In other words, we can say the certainty is a measure of conflict between observer' experiences with their believabilities and chances of observations with their probabilities. This new semantics of the old familiar terms in an unusual combination represents the main difficulty in understanding the new theory of experience and chance.
